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Abstract Theories of political budget cycles have been contested because scholars find that
incumbents can manipulate deficits in the pre-election period only if fiscal transparency is
low. I argue that these findings do not generally rule out the possibility of fiscal election-
eering. Governments may increase spending on highly visible policies. The composition of
the budget serves as a second-best strategy. It increases political support without straining
the budget balance. An empirical analysis of the West German states reveals alternative elec-
toral budget strategies and ultimately point to the importance of analyzing how governments
choose between alternative fiscal instruments.
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1 Introduction
An incumbent can increase her chances of re-election if she improves voter welfare before
the election. She could inflate the economy to stimulate growth but the international integra-
tion of financial markets and the increase of central bank independence reduce her ability
to control monetary policy, and effectively tie one of her hands behind her back. Another
alternative is to pursue expansive fiscal policies, which allow the incumbent to provide more
public goods or social services. With one of her hands already tied, she should have strong
incentives to resort to manipulating fiscal policy. Deficit spending in the pre-election period
is most often associated with a political budget cycle (PBC).1 In this scenario, incumbents
1For example. Rogoff (1990); Rogoff and Sibert (1988); Alt and Lassen (2006a, 2006b); Shi and Svensson
(2006).
2Most approaches predict an increase in deficits before elections assuming that although voters dislike an
increase in their individual tax contributions as well as deficits they only observe the level of taxes directly.
Note, however, that cycles in fiscal policies are not necessarily limited to expenditure policies but can occur
on the revenue side as well (Belke and Schneider 2006; Belke et al. 2007).
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incur higher deficits in order to finance the expansion of public spending and transfer pay-
ments before elections.2 Yet, the ability to incur higher deficits is restricted by institutional
constraints such as legal restrictions on the size of the deficit or membership in the European
Monetary Union (EMU). Additionally, voters tend to punish leaders who are running up a
budget deficit right before elections.3 This seems to tie her other hand, and as a result many
scholars have concluded that in these cases electoral cycles in fiscal policies do not exist.4
I argue that this conclusion is too optimistic because the absence of deficit spending
before elections does not rule out the possibility that leaders manipulate other expenditure
policies for electoral gain. For instance, they can target certain groups of voters and improve
their welfare while maintaining a balanced budget. Incumbents could increase spending on
election-relevant items while reducing spending on other items (Drazen and Eslava 2005,
2006; Veiga and Veiga 2007). The increase in social transfers during the pre-election period
is one of the most robust findings in the literature on PBCs (Franzese 2002a: 380). Yet,
scholars tend to draw general conclusions from the analysis of isolated fiscal strategies such
as deficit spending. My analysis of alternative pre-election strategies in the German states
(Bundesländer) shows that even when deficit spending is not possible due to institutional
constraints or voter preferences, political budget cycles still exist and should be expected.
I find that even though incumbents on the state level decrease deficit spending and maintain
a balanced budget they do increase social transfers in the pre-election period. This echoes
Alt and Lassen (2006a, 2006b) and others who argue that there should be no cycles in
deficit spending in countries with relatively transparent fiscal institutions. At the same time,
I show that incumbents are not restricted to deficit spending but may choose alternative fiscal
policy instruments—e.g., an increase in transfer payments (retaining a balanced budget)—to
increase political support before an election.
The findings demonstrate that inferences from the empirical analysis of PBCs should not
solely rely on the analysis of deficit spending (or any other budget item). Even if deficit
spending is not feasible for institutional or political reasons, incumbents usually draw from
alternative fiscal strategies to increase voter support. My paper therefore provides the em-
pirical basis for an integrated explanation of fiscal strategies. Governments choose between
alternative fiscal strategies (e.g., taxation, deficit spending, composition of expenditures,
revenues) in the pre-election period. To understand these opportunistic choices, it is vital to
move away from examining alternative strategies in isolation. My paper points to some of
the conditions under which governments rely on one or the other instrument. For example,
deficit cycles should become less likely if fiscal transparency is high. Cycles in the budget
composition, however, can still exist under this condition. Future research has to specify
those conditions more explicitly in order to provide a unified account of political business
cycles.
2 Can governments signal competence to the electorate?
The incumbent’s incentive to stimulate the economy before elections has attracted scholarly
attention in both economics and political science and a number of highly diversified theories
3See, inter alia, Peltzman (1992); Alesina et al. (1998); Brender (2003); Buti and van der Noord (2003); Von
Hagen (2003); Andrikopoulos et al. (2004); Brender and Drazen (2005); Drazen and Eslava (2005); Mink
and de Haan (2005); Alt and Lassen (2006a, 2006b); Schneider (2007).
4Some examples are Persson and Tabellini (2002, 2003b), Shi and Svensson (2000, 2002, 2006), and Brender
and Drazen (2005). They argue that macro-political budget cycles are restricted to weak or new democracies.
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exist. Initially, scholars applied the logic of the Philips curve (which constitutes an inverse
relationship between inflation and unemployment) to provide an explanation for opportunis-
tic political business cycles. In these models, the electorate votes retrospectively and gov-
ernments expand monetary policies to lower unemployment before elections (Kramer 1971;
Nordhaus 1975; Tufte 1975, 1978; Lindbeck 1976; Fair 1978; Hibbs 1977, 1987).
Later approaches relax the assumption that expectations about the inflation are adaptive
and treat voter expectations as rational and anticipatory (Alesina 1987, 1988; Persson and
Tabellini 1990). Governments cannot simply generate political business cycles because vot-
ers (who anticipate that lower unemployment before the election will lead to higher inflation
after the election) adjust their behavior accordingly. Consequently, incumbents are attracted
to expansionary monetary policies only if they can signal economic competence to the elec-
torate (Persson and Tabellini 1990).5
The relevance of monetary business cycles has declined because—in the course of in-
ternational economic and financial integration and the emergence of independent central
banks—few governments still autonomously command monetary policy instruments.6 The
incumbents’ incentive to rely on political budget cycles should have therefore increased and
scholars have focused on examining electoral cycles in expenditure policies.
Political budget cycles occur when governments expand the budget before elections and
contract the budget in the aftermath of elections. The underlying logic of cycles in expen-
diture policies is similar to opportunistic monetary politics. Voters prefer governments that
are able to provide more public goods for given levels of taxation and private consumption
(Rogoff 1990; Shi and Svensson 2002; Alt and Lassen 2006a, 2006b). To form expecta-
tions about the government’s economic performance, they observe how well governments
convert revenues into public goods and vote for incumbents who are able to provide above-
average levels of public goods before the elections. Only competent governments can in-
crease the provision of public goods above average levels in the period before elections
without distorting the economy. Incompetent governments would therefore refrain from
using stimulating policies before the elections. If fiscal operations are not observable and
incumbents do not know their own competence, however, incumbents could increase the
government deficit to pursue expansionary fiscal policies in the hope that the electorate at-
tributes the increased provision of public goods to the incumbent’s performance. This is
what scholars dub ‘hidden effort’ (Persson and Tabellini 2002; Shi and Svensson 2002;
Mink and de Haan 2005). Deficit spending—a policy instrument that is assumed to be hid-
den from the electorate—induces all governments, competent and incompetent, to generate
political budget cycles. They simply increase the deficit in order to provide an above-average
amount of public goods to the population. Thus, scholars concluded that cycles in expendi-
ture policies should be more likely if governments (i) do not know their own competence
level and are thus uncertain about how well they perform without distorting the budget, and
(ii) cannot exploit monetary policies in the pre-election period. Scholarly work has focused
on testing whether cycles in deficit spending exist because all governments increase deficits
before elections in order to maximize public good provisions.
5In addition, scholars distinguish between governments acting either purely opportunistic or according to
partisanship (Hibbs 1977; Alesina 1989; Cusack 1997; Midtbo 1998; Boix 2000; Grier 2008). Drazen (2000)
and Franzese (2002a) provide an excellent overview.
6Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996); Lohmann (1992, 1997); Jonsson (1995); Simmons (1996); Boix (1998, 2000);
Clark et al. (1998); Garrett (1998); Franzese (1999, 2003); Oatley (1999); Clark and Hallerberg (2000); Way
(2000); Broz and Frieden (2001); Bernhard et al. (2002); Broz (2002); Clark (2002a).
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These straightforward theoretical predictions find surprisingly little support. Whereas
there is some evidence for an increase in targeted expenditures before elections,7 only a
few studies report opportunistically motivated deficit spending.8 Other scholars find no or a
negative relationship between the pre-election period and higher spending or deficits.9 The
inconclusive findings even raised doubts about the very existence of fiscal political business
cycles.10
To explain why many empirical cross-country and single-country analyses fail to find
consistent evidence for deficit-induced business cycles, recent work has been concerned
with the conditions under which incumbents cannot imbalance their finances to manipu-
late the economy before elections. For example, early work has not tested whether cycles
in deficit spending are feasible instruments only if their effects are hidden from the elec-
torate. More recent work explicitly acknowledges that voters tend to punish governments if
they increase deficits before elections expecting that “a more ‘competent’ policymaker can
expand government spending or reduce taxes and still not induce the distortion that a less
‘competent’ policymaker would induce” (Drazen 2000: 101). Indeed, most empirical work
finds that incumbents lose political support if they visibly increase deficits before the elec-
tions.11 Incompetent governments may feign competence if the share of informed voters is
relatively low and the rents of remaining in power are high (Shi and Svensson 2002). The
amount of information the voter receives about the incumbent’s actions (and thus the extent
to which electioneering is possible) may depend, for example, on the transparency of fiscal
institutions within a country. Fiscal transparency is defined as
“public openness about the structure and functions of government, fiscal policy in-
tentions, public sector accounts, and projections. It involves ready access to reliable,
comprehensive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable information
on government activities (. . .) so that the electorate and financial markets can accu-
rately assess the government’s financial position and the true costs and benefits of
government activities, including their present and future economic and social impli-
cations” (Kopits and Craig 1998, 1).
In fiscally transparent systems, voters observe when incumbents raise deficits above aver-
age before elections. The resulting loss in public support induces incumbents to abstain from
deficit spending in the pre-election period. In their seminal work on fiscal transparency and
political budget cycles, Alt and Lassen (2006a: 2) conclude that “where institutions are less
transparent, the cycle in fiscal balance appears, while we find no such election-related move-
ments in higher-transparency countries.” Others infer that macro-political budget cycles are
restricted to democracies that are either ‘weak’ or ‘new’ because voters cannot monitor the
fiscal policy process in those countries.12
Prima facie, these results suggest that fiscal transparency as well as other domestic and
international constraints inhibit or at least complicate political budget cycles because gov-
ernments cannot rely on deficit spending anymore. This should improve fiscal performance
7For example, Tufte (1978), Alesina and Roubini (1992); Franzese (2002b).
8Alesina et al. (1992, 1997); Shi and Svensson (2006); Persson and Tabellini (2003a).
9Brender and Drazen (2005); Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2005); De Haan and Sturm (1994); Drazen and
Eslava (2005); Seitz (2000).
10See footnote 4.
11See footnote 3.
12Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004); Persson and Tabellini (2002, 2003a, 2003b); Shi and Svensson (2000,
2002, 2006); Brender and Drazen (2005).
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particularly in countries with high fiscal transparency. In line with Alt and Lassen, I argue
that deficit spending should indeed have become less attractive in countries where fiscal
transparency is high. However, fiscal transparency only ties one of the incumbent’s hands
behind her back. Governments may still induce electoral cycles with alternative fiscal means.
A growing body of literature provides evidence of electioneering in the composition of
budget expenditures. Work in this area shows that incumbents increase spending on spe-
cific budget items such as social security while decreasing spending on others. So far, these
different strategies have been largely analyzed in isolation. The fact that electoral cycles in
the composition of the budget are most likely in sub-national entities (the sub-national level
has greater constraints on fiscal and monetary policy tools), however, suggests that different
fiscal strategies are related to one another.
Domestic and international constraints on deficit spending—such as fiscal transparency—
induce a trade off for governments. Incumbents want to increase public spending in order to
signal competence to the electorate. However, they cannot raise deficits in the pre-election
period to finance public good provision because deficits are either observed by voters or
simply not possible. To the contrary, in fiscally transparent systems governments signal eco-
nomic competence if they decrease deficit growth in the pre-election period. Voters take the
reduction in the budget deficit as a signal of the incumbent’s economic competence, holding
all else constant. In this situation, incumbents seek for alternative strategies. Combining the
two strands of the literature suggests that electoral cycles in directly manipulable policies
such as transfer payments (retaining a balanced budget) are used as an alternative elec-
toral strategy when deficit spending is not sufficient to generate political support. With this
strategy, governments can spend more on specific policies even if they hold the overall bud-
get constant because they increase spending in specific budget categories while decreasing
spending on other policies.
To summarize, conclusions about the existence of an electoral cycle should not rest on
an analysis of isolated fiscal strategies. Whether incumbents use one or the other strategy
depends on preferences, political circumstances, and institutional constraints. I argue that
PBCs in public good provision may exist even in countries where deficit spending is un-
likely. In these cases, governments are more inclined to manipulate the composition of the
budget as second-best strategy when deficit spending is not feasible. Governments will fi-
nance the higher provision of public goods by decreasing spending on election-irrelevant
budget items. This allows governments to claim credit for reducing pre-election budget
deficits.
The main testable implications are that if we analyze countries in which fiscal trans-
parency is high, then (1) we should not observe any cycles in budget deficits or overall
expenditures (but rather a decline in deficits), but (2) we should still be able to observe an
increase in public good provision.
The German states (Bundesländer) are an example in which results for a PBC are
mixed.13 These contradicting results are rather puzzling because German state governments
have no monetary or tax authority. They should be particularly attracted to fiscal policies
in the pre-election period. However, none of these studies explicitly addressed the fact that
fiscal transparency restricts the extent to which German state governments can incur deficits
before elections. According to the literature, we should expect no electoral cycles to ex-
ist in the German states. In the following, I will show empirically that this conclusion is
misleading.
13For example, Galli and Rossi (2002); Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2005); Berger and Holler (2007). Other
work on Germany focuses on monetary business cycles and partisan cycles (e.g., Belke 2000; Berger and
Woitek 1997a, 1997b, 2001; Seitz 2000; Vaubel 1997).
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3 Empirical analysis
This section demonstrates the interconnectedness of electoral strategies in order to provide
a basis for future theory building as to how governments choose between different fiscal
strategies when maximizing their chances for reelection. I examine whether electoral cycles
in fiscal policies are generally absent when incumbents are institutionally constrained and
not able to increase deficits before elections. Such a task is difficult because countries have
varying institutional constraints and incumbents have different fiscal instruments at their dis-
posal. Instead of raising deficits, they could lower taxes or simply rely on monetary policy
instruments to induce political support. It is thus important to hold monetary and tax policies
constant. At the same time, two other conditions have to be fulfilled to create an appropri-
ate setting for empirical analysis. On one hand, the quality of the empirical test would be
greatly increased if institutional and economic factors such as fiscal transparency, economic
openness, and the electoral system are held constant. On the other hand, incumbents should
still have the leverage to influence fiscal policies.
A comparative analysis of the German states constitutes a good test case because it fulfills
all necessary conditions. The German federal system consists of the federal level, the state
level, and the local level. On the state level, there are 16 states with substantial governmental
authority as determined by the German basic law (Grundgesetz).14 Art. 71ff. play a decisive
role because they assign decision-making responsibilities to the different levels of govern-
ment. According to Article 71ff. state governments have important decision-making powers
for many spending categories such as social security, administration, and health. These poli-
cies, together with deficit spending, are most attractive for electoral manipulation.
At the same time, state governments have no monetary authority and cannot generate
electoral cycles using monetary policy instruments. They also have limited access to tax
instruments through the federal council (Bundesrat). Governments must rely on expenditure
policies if they aim to electioneer. For the analysis, this implies that insignificant findings
between the pre-election period and deficit spending cannot be traced to the existence of
monetary business cycles. This simplifies the analysis of alternative fiscal strategies and sets
the basis for an analysis of fiscal strategies under institutional constraints.
The German case also holds fiscal transparency constant. My main argument is that PBCs
may exist even if (or maybe because) governments cannot increase benefits for the electorate
by increasing deficits. According to the literature discussed above, budget cycles are least
likely in regimes with fiscally transparent institutions. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) report on fiscal transparency in Germany concludes that
“Germany has achieved a high level of fiscal transparency. Fiscal management is car-
ried out in accordance with a comprehensive, precise, and carefully respected body of
laws and regulations. While Germany’s fiscal system is highly decentralized and dif-
ferent levels of government enjoy significant autonomy, a common legal framework
clearly assigns roles and responsibilities. Sound standards for budgeting, accounting,
and reporting apply to all levels of government, multiyear budget preparation is an
integral part of the process, and fiscal reporting includes contingent liabilities, guar-
antees, tax expenditures, and equity holdings” (IMF 2003: 1).15
14Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt,
Schleswig-Holstein and Thüringen.
15Alternative indices of fiscal transparency are largely congruent with this assessment (e.g. De Haan and
Sturm 1994; Von Hagen 1992). Alt and Lassen assign Germany a lower grade but the authors note that their
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In line with this assessment, incumbents in the German states get punished at the ballots
if governments increase budget deficits before elections (Schneider 2007). Thus, despite
the absence of national and international restrictions for public debt incumbents should not
have strong incentives to increase budget deficits before elections. Besides being necessary
for my analysis, this fact also provides a tough testing ground for my argument. According
to the literature, electoral cycles in transfer payments should be less likely or non-existent if
they do not exist in deficit spending. Demonstrating the existence of such transfer cycles in
combination with the nonexistence of deficit and spending cycles supports my argument that
governments are not restricted to deficit spending but may employ alternative electioneering
policies.
Finally, the comparative study of German states bears the advantage that many other in-
stitutional factors (such as the electoral system and economic openness) are constant across
states and do not have to be controlled for.
3.1 Data set and variables
The empirical analysis uses a unique data set of public spending and deficits in the West
German states from 1970 to 2003. I excluded the East German states because (incomplete)
data are only available from 1992 onwards. An independent estimation for both samples is
not possible because data for Berlin do not exist for East and West Germany separately. The
unit of analysis is the state-year.
My theoretical argument first implies that we should not observe any cycles in budget
deficits or overall expenditures in the German states (because fiscal transparency is rela-
tively high). Rather, incumbents can signal economic competence if they visibly reduce
budget deficits before the elections. However, secondly, we should still be able to observe
an increase in public good provision (because governments can redistribute resources from
budget items that are less relevant for elections). Despite being less attractive to govern-
ments (this strategy addresses only a targeted group of voters and implies contractions in
other spending items), incumbents are attracted to target spending if nothing else because
they sometimes do not have another choice. In other words, whereas the literature suggests
the absence of targeted spending if the incumbent cannot increase deficits before elections
my argument suggests that cycles in targeted spending should exist even if incumbents can-
not increase deficits before elections.
To examine this assertion, I have to analyze a policy item that “(. . .) can deliver timed and
clearly attributable (to incumbents) economic benefits to large numbers or specific groups of
voters” (Tufte 1978; Franzese 2002a: 380). Social security expenditure fulfils these criteria
and has become one of the most commonly analyzed targeted spending items in the literature
on PBCs in fiscal policies.16 As an additional advantage, German state governments play an
important role in the decision-making process (Art. 74 Basic Law). In sum, whereas cycles
in deficit spending are unattractive for incumbents, my argument would be refuted if I did
not find electoral cycles in social security spending.
My main dependent variables are therefore the annual growth of (i) the budget deficit,
(ii) overall expenditures, and (iii) social security expenditures. All three variables are mea-
sured on the German state level. I took the natural logarithm of all three dependent variables.
“transparency index understates it [fiscal transparency] in France and Germany” (Alt and Lassen 2006b:
1417).
16Wright (1974); Ben-Porath (1975); Tufte (1978); Alesina (1988); Keech and Pak (1989); Blais and Nadeau
(1992); Franzese (1999, 2002b, 2003); Shi and Svensson (2002); Clark (2002a, 2002b); Galli and Rossi
(2002); Drazen and Eslava (2005).
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The growth of the budget deficit, for example, is calculated as Deficit = ln(Deficitt ) −
ln(Deficitt−1). Data was provided by the Federal Statistical Office Germany.
To capture opportunistic election strategies I follow Franzese (2000) and generate an in-
dicator for the pre-election year that takes into account the month in which the election is
held. Instead of using a simple dichotomous indicator, the pre-election indicator varies be-
tween 0 and 1. In the pre-election year the indicator is calculated as (12 − (M − 1))/12,
whereby M is the month in which the election took place. The indicator takes smaller val-
ues the later in the year the election takes place and takes the value 0 for all other years.
Pre-election Year constitutes the exogenous variable of main interest in the model but it is
important to control for the extent of electoral competition.17 The smaller the majority of
the government coalition and the higher the odds that the government will not be re-elected,
the more governments are inclined to manipulate the budget cycle. It is impossible to predict
the tightness of the electoral outcome but I approximate by measuring the coalition govern-
ment’s vote share in the pre-election period.18 The larger the government’s vote share, the
less important it is to appear competent to the electorate.
Additionally, whereas governments on the state level do not have command over mone-
tary policy instruments research suggests that the Governing Council of the German Central
Bank (Bundesbank) took into account the specific interests of some larger German states at
least until the Maastricht Treaty put more restrictions on its policies in 1993 (e.g., Berger and
Woitek 1997b, 2001; Lohmann 1997; Vaubel 1997). This could have factually diminished
incentives to generate political budget cycles before 1993. I test for this structural break by
adding an interaction term between Pre-election Year and a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 for all years from 1993.19
Additional control variables serve to check for the robustness of the main findings. I con-
trol for the inflation rate (country level), absolute employment in 1000 workers (state level),
growth of the GDP (constant prices 1995), and for the first and second oil crisis in 1974/75
and 1978–1981, respectively.20 I use the natural logarithms of all economic variables and
also lag the economic variables on the state level in order to avoid potential problems of
endogeneity or reverse causality. A dichotomous variable accounts for German unification
taking the value 1 for all years after 1990 and a dummy variable captures different effects
for the city states Bremen and Hamburg. It is necessary to control for the city states because
(contrary to the territorial states) their budgets include the budgets of local authorities.
Many scholars argue that economic policies are not only driven by opportunistic consid-
erations, but also by partisan ideology. Those approaches typically distinguish governments
on a left-right dimension whereby left governments are assumed to be more inclined to
increase deficits than conservative governments. There are four major parties in the West
17For example, Wright (1974); Tufte (1978); Schultz (1995); Price (1998); John and Ward (2001); Sutter
(2003).
18Gschwend and Norpoth (2005) show that past election results are very good predictors for future electoral
outcomes. For this reason, and because the variable does not constitute my main independent variable, I rely
on this proxy to control for electoral competition.
19Note, the results are substantively the same if I use 1999 as break point (when monetary policy was com-
pletely handed over to the ECB). Results are available upon request.
20I also checked the robustness of my results by controlling for the lag of the natural logarithm of the size of
(i) the overall population and (ii) the population which is over 65 years old. An ageing of the “Baby Boom”
generation could have boosted social security spending at least in some states. The preelection effect is robust
to the inclusion of such variables. However, I excluded them from the main tables because the variables are
highly correlated with total employment. Results are available upon request.
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German party system: the conservative Christian Democratic Party (CDU), the Social De-
mocratic Party (SPD), the Liberal Party (FDP), and the Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grü-
nen). Governments typically comprise majorities run by one of the two big parties (CDU,
SPD) or a coalition between CDU or SPD and one of the smaller parties. Applying the par-
tisan hypothesis to the German case would imply that the CDU as the more conservative
party is less inclined to re-distributive policies in the pre-election years than the SPD. I use a
dummy variable that takes 1 if the SPD is in government and 0 if the CDU is in government.
Additionally, I control for situations in which the FDP is part of the government because
this would imply a right-shift of the SPD government. I further add a dichotomous variable
that controls for cases in which SPD and CDU formed a grand coalition. The data set incor-
porates three grand coalitions: Bremen (1995–2003), Baden-Württemberg (1970–1971) and
Baden-Württemberg (1992–1995). Potential partisan effects should decline in these cases.
In order to check the robustness of the results I estimate the models using dummy variables
for specific coalitions (SPD, CDU, SPD-FDP, CDU-FDP, SPD-Grüne).21 I also control for
the partisanship of the federal government to examine whether state governments that have
the same partisanship as the federal government are more likely to conduct opportunistic
politics. Results for all robustness checks and descriptive statistics are available in the web
appendix on the author’s webpage.
3.2 Estimation procedure
The structure of the data demands the estimation of a time series cross-sectional model.
I rely on a fixed effects model because the Hausman test suggests that alternatives (such as
the random effects model or the pooled OLS model) would render the coefficients inconsis-
tent and biased. Additionally, a fixed effects model is warranted theoretically because I am
most interested in whether an incumbent manipulates expenditure if that state has an upcom-
ing election, thus, in changes over time within states. City States does not vary over time and
the fixed effects model does not allow estimating time-invariant coefficients. I therefore esti-
mate a variant of the fixed effects estimator: the fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD)
estimator. This three-step model first estimates the constant unit effects. It then decomposes
the unit effects into two parts, one of which is explained by the time-invariant variables and
another unexplained part that is used in a pooled OLS estimation as a control for the unit
effects (Plümper and Troeger 2007). Whereas City States would be dropped in a traditional
fixed-effects model, FEVD allows me to estimate a fixed effects model which includes time-
invariant variables. Note, however, that the results of the main independent variable do not
differ substantively in a pure fixed effects model (estimated without City States). Because
of this and the importance of controlling for the city states which have additional budget
receipts the FEVD estimator is preferable.
The FEVD estimator performs better than the alternative Hausman-Taylor (HT) proce-
dure (Hausman and Taylor 1981). The HT procedure uses exogenous time-varying variables
as instruments for the endogenous time-varying variables and exogenous time-invariant vari-
ables plus the unit means of the exogenous time-varying variables as instruments for the en-
dogenous time-invariant variables. The HT estimator provides a solution if the instruments
be uncorrelated with the errors and the unit effects but highly correlated with the endogenous
21The data set incorporates four observations in which the SPD formed a coalition government with the
FDP and the Grüne. The findings are substantively the same if I code these observations into the SPD-Grüne
coalition or into the SPD-FDP coalition.
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regressors. The problem is to identify such instruments because the unit effects are often-
times unobservable. Monte Carlo analysis demonstrates that the HT performs relatively poor
particularly in comparison to the FEVD model (Plümper and Troeger 2007).
The Durbin-Watson statistic of an untransformed model points to serial correlation.
Whereas both the Prais-Winsten transformation and the Lagged-Dependent-Variable model
(LDV) address the problem of serial correlation modeling an AR1 process seems more ap-
propriate in this case. Nickell (1981) shows that the size of the coefficients in a LDV model
cannot be interpreted directly because the coefficient of the LDV includes the first lags of all
the coefficients of the other independent variables (which are correlated with the variables
on the right-hand side of the equation). A LDV should also not be estimated if it was not
explicitly derived from the theory because the variable will eliminate most of the variance
in the dependent variable. This necessarily reduces the significance of all other indepen-
dent variables. Achen (2000) demonstrates that claims that budgets are caused primarily by
last year’s budget are probable statistical artefacts. Including a LDV induces a substantial
downward bias to the substantive coefficients (sometimes even to incorrect signs) and an
artificial inflation of the LDV effect. I use the Prais-Winsten transformation because my the-
ory does not warrant the inclusion of a LDV.22 The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that
the transformed estimator sufficiently reduces serial correlation. A standard AR(1)-process
is estimated because the serial correlation of the errors is not unit specific.
Additionally, I enter a trend variable into the regression to control for dynamics over time
and use panel-corrected standard errors to address heteroskedasticity of the error term across
German states (Beck and Katz 1995).
3.3 Estimation results
Table 1 presents the empirical results for deficit spending in West German states.23 The
model fits the data quite well with the F -test being significant for all model specifications.
It is highly unlikely that the joint impact of the variables is zero.
Model 1 is the baseline model testing whether governments increase deficits in the year
before the election in order to provide more public goods. The estimation results reveal that
state governments abstain from raising deficits in the pre-election period. To the contrary,
deficit growth declines by over 1% in the year before an election. The negative deficit growth
is significant at the 10%-level and robust over all model specifications (including estimations
that control for the election and the post-election year).24 The finding echoes the theoretical
and empirical literature discussed above. Fiscal transparency reduces the incumbent’s in-
centive to raise deficits in the pre-election period. Incumbents seem to visibly reduce budget
deficits instead. This signals economic competence when voters observe deficits.
Model 2 analyzes whether the incentives to signal competence increase with expected
electoral competition. The interaction term examines the impact of the pre-election period
on the deficit growth for different levels of electoral competition. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to analyze the conditional effect directly. Table 2 presents the pre-election deficit
growth for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th sample percentiles of the government’s seat
share in the state parliament. The second column presents actual sample values.
22A dynamic model using the method of general moments is not appropriate because the characteristics of
this estimator are unknown for samples with only few observations across time and space (e.g. Greene 2003:
Chap. 13.6).
23All models are estimated with Stata 10. Replication files are available on the author’s webpage.
24See Tables 6 and 7 in the web Appendix.
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Table 1 Estimation results: deficit spending growth
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Baseline) (Competition) (Maastricht) (Partisan)
Pre-election Year −0.013* −0.025 −0.019** −0.014*
(0.007) (0.064) (0.009) (0.007)
SPD in Government 0.001
(0.005)












Inflation (Federal) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Employment (State) 0.310** 0.291** 0.277** 0.276**
(0.086) (0.089) (0.087) (0.088)
GDP Growth (State) −0.380* −0.381* −0.360* −0.391*
(0.205) (0.205) (0.205) (0.204)
City States 0.444** 0.418** 0.398** 0.397**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Unification −0.009 −0.007 −0.007
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
1. Oil Crisis 0.023* 0.023* 0.024* 0.022*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
2. Oil Crisis 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Trend −0.005 −0.005 −0.006 −0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Residuals 1.006** 1.014** 1.002** 1.003**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Constant −2.239** −2.069** −1.977** −1.977**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Conditional coefficient (see Table 3) −0.005
(0.012)
N 280 280 280 280
Adjusted R2 0.564 0.562 0.561 0.562
F -test 1850** 1370** 1051** 1030**
Two-tailed test ∗ = p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05; robust standard errors are in parentheses
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Table 2 Conditional effects of electoral competition
Sample percentile Sample value Deficit Spending Social security
(Table 2) (Table 4) (Table 5)
10th 47.9% −0.014 −0.009 0.016
(0.008)* (0.008) (0.010)
25th 49.2% −0.014 −0.009 0.015*
(0.008)* (0.008) (0.009)
50th 50.9% −0.013 −0.009 0.015*
(0.007)* (0.008) (0.009)
75th 53.9% −0.013 −0.010 0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
90th 58.3% −0.013 −0.010 0.012
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Two-tailed test ∗ = p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05; robust standard errors are in parentheses
The third column in Table 2 presents the conditional coefficients for deficit spending.
They clearly show that governments reduce budget deficits only when the governmental
coalition does not possess a comfortable majority in parliament. If incumbents have more
than 53% of the seats in parliament they have no incentive to decrease deficits before the
election. In this case, they do not have to worry about re-election and may thus spend more
on public goods at the expense of a balanced budget (even though voters are informed about
public deficits). The budget cycle does not become stronger the smaller the majority. This
may be due to the coding of the independent variable which does not account for exogenous
shocks to public support in the pre-election year.
Model 3 further indicates a structural break in opportunistic policies after 1993. Whereas
incumbents significantly decreased budget deficits before 1993, the Maastricht Treaty which
factually reduced the possibility of generating electoral cycles via the German Central Bank
diminished and increased the necessity to exploit expenditure policies. Accordingly, I find
that governments did not decrease deficits before elections after 1993 (see Conditional Co-
efficient which indicates the pre-electoral deficit after 1993). The opportunistic decrease in
state deficits in the pre-election period before 1993 is only significant for CDU state govern-
ments (see Appendix, Table 10). In other words, my findings refine the existing results on
deficit cycles in German states. Incumbents in the German states do not generally decrease
deficits before elections. The incentives to do so was higher for CDU-led governments and
decreased after incumbents could not indirectly exploit monetary policy anymore.
Finally, Model 4 finds no indication of a partisan cycle in state deficits (see, however,
Table 10 for partisan effects in the pre-election period). This finding is robust to estimating
the regression with specific coalition dummies or controlling for the ideology of the federal
government (see Appendix, Tables 8 and 9) and in line with most work on partisan cycles in
the German states (e.g., Seitz 2000; Galli and Rossi 2002; Jochimsen and Nuscheler 2005;
Berger and Holler 2007).25 One possible explanation for this finding is that conservative
25Belke (2000) finds evidence of partisan cycles in employment on the federal level using co-integration
techniques. Interestingly, Table 9 shows that state governments seem to incur higher debts if the federal
government is led by the SPD (but not if the FDP is part of the governmental coalition). However, this does
not seem conditional on the partisanship of the state government itself.
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bankers of the German Central Bank have counteracted any attempts to engage in expan-
sionary policies under leftist state governments. Furthermore, grand coalitions between the
SPD and the CDU significantly reduce state deficits by about 0.5%. Recall, however, that we
cannot draw generalizable conclusion from this finding because there only are three grand
coalitions in the data set.
I now turn to the discussion of the control variables. Whereas the inflation rate does not
affect public deficit growth, high economic growth significantly decreases incentives for
governments to increase deficits. The two oil crises have further contributed to a significant
growth of the budget deficit. The deficit growth of the city states Hamburg and Bremen is
approximately 40% higher than the deficit growth of the remaining German states. These re-
sults provide some evidence for a moral hazard in small German states. In 1992 the German
constitutional court justified the entitlement to a bail-out for Bremen and Saarland. This rul-
ing could have contributed to declining incentives of certain states to limit state deficits. In
fact, consistently high deficits in smaller states triggered debates about the survivability of
small states in the federal system and raised demands for integrating them into larger states.
Finally, German re-unification has had no significant effect on budget deficits.26
Table 3 presents the models investigating electoral cycles in overall government expendi-
tures. German state governments do not seem to increase overall spending before elections.
This is not very surprising. Since state governments cannot easily manipulate taxes or deficit
spending, they cannot raise overall expenditures in the pre-election year. Similar to deficit
spending, governments do not seem to significantly change their strategies under different
levels of electoral competition or partisanship (see also Appendix, Tables 8 and 9). The
growth rate of overall spending is approximately 20% higher in the two city states than in
the other German states. Neither German unification nor most of the other economic con-
trol variables exert a robust and significant influence on the growth rate of overall spending.
Nevertheless, overall spending grew significantly during the second oil crisis.
Without further analysis, the results would suggest that governments do not rely on fiscal
policies to generate political support. Following my argument, however, cycles in transfer
payments should still occur. Although governments cannot expand overall expenditures,
they can increase social security expenditures at the expense of other budget items. This
improves the welfare of voters without signalling incompetence.
Table 4 reports the results of the estimated model for social security spending and reveals
very interesting insights into the electoral strategies of incumbent governments. The growth
of social security expenditures increases by almost 2% in the period before an election.
This significant and robust effect is a rather large. Social security represents just one of nine
budget categories and on average social security spending growth is 5% (across states and
time). Model 11 which controls for the structural break in 1993 indicates that social security
expenditures have been growing by almost 4% in the pre-election period after the Maastricht
Treaty reduced the German Central Bank’s monetary policy autonomy (see Conditional
Coefficient). The effect is significant at the 5% level. In combination with the findings on
the overall budget balance, I can infer that incumbents manipulate the composition of the
budget when institutional constraints inhibit the use of tax instruments, monetary policies,
or budget deficits. In other words, incumbents at the German state level appear to increase
the provision of public goods at the expense of other budget items that might not be directly
relevant or observable in the year before the election. For example, Fig. 1 presents the growth
of education spending in Bremen (dashed lines mark pre-election years).
26This result is consistent with the arguments reported by Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2005).
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Table 3 Estimation results: overall spending growth
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
(Baseline) (Competition) (Maastricht) (Partisan)
Pre-election Year −0.009 −0.001 0.002 −0.009
(0.008) (0.064) (0.010) (0.008)
Winning Margin*Preelection −0.000
(0.001)






SPD in Government −0.003
(0.005)




Inflation (Federal) 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Employment (State) 0.145 0.176 0.111 0.149
(0.109) (0.125) (0.110) (0.122)
GDP Growth (State) 0.129 0.131 0.083 0.123
(0.308) (0.307) (0.290) (0.307)
City States 0.198** 0.240** 0.151** 0.205**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.037) (0.030)
Unification −0.041 −0.043 −0.040
(0.039) (0.038) (0.039)
1. Oil Crisis 0.026 0.025 0.036* 0.024
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
2. Oil Crisis 0.012** 0.012** 0.016** 0.011*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Trend −0.000 −0.000 0.001 −0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Residuals 0.949** 0.936** 0.975** 0.946**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
Constant −1.082** −1.340** −0.832** −1.111**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Conditional Coefficient (see Table 3) −0.015
(0.011)
N 240 240 240 240
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.198 0.260 0.194
F -test 1415** 1735** 730.3** 1139**
Two-tailed test ∗ = p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05; robust standard errors are in parentheses
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Table 4 Estimation results: social security expenditures
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
(Baseline) (Competition) (Maastricht) (Partisan)
Pre-election Year 0.016* 0.032 0.005 0.016*
(0.009) (0.077) (0.012) (0.009)
Winning Margin*Preelection −0.000
(0.002)






SPD in Government −0.002
(0.006)




Inflation (Federal) 0.002 0.001 −0.002 0.002
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Employment (State) 0.642** 0.751** 0.506** 0.699**
(0.135) (0.152) (0.131) (0.153)
GDP Growth (State) −0.401 −0.401 −0.460 −0.391
(0.338) (0.332) (0.324) (0.334)
City States 0.892** 1.041** 0.703** 0.968**
(0.033) (0.032) (0.041) (0.033)
Unification −0.083** −0.090** −0.087**
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
1. Oil Crisis 0.074** 0.072** 0.084** 0.072**
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
2. Oil Crisis 0.032** 0.032** 0.037** 0.031**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
Trend −0.001 −0.001 0.000 −0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Residuals 1.025** 1.015** 1.007** 1.024**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant −4.921** −5.841** −3.878** −5.357**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Conditional coefficient (see Table 3) 0.038**
(0.014)
N 240 240 240 240
Adjusted R2 0.283 0.296 0.314 0.280
F -test 8403** 8873** 4703** 7077**
Two-tailed test ∗ = p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05; robust standard errors are in parentheses
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Fig. 1 Education spending growth in Bremen, 1975–2003
The graph depicts that governments in Bremen tend to decrease spending on education
particularly in the pre-election year while increasing social security spending (data avail-
able upon request). However, not all states decrease pre-electoral education spending con-
sistently. Future research has to develop theories that explain the variations across states and
partisanship.
Additionally, cycles in social security expenditures exist before 1993 but only for certain
states. This provides some support for the argument that the German Central Bank allowed
some states to generate monetary cycles in the pre-election period and bolsters this paper’s
call for more in-depth analysis of substitution effects in opportunistic policies. Ultimately,
Table 4 provides evidence that governments (i) by all means employ fiscal policies to stim-
ulate the economy even if they cannot use deficit spending, and (ii) that they have different
fiscal instruments at hand.
Model 10 further shows that governments are only attracted to opportunistic expendi-
ture policies if elections are close. Ideology does not seem to affect expenditures on social
security (see also Appendix, Tables 8 and 9). Only grand coalitions have higher social secu-
rity expenditures. As expected, economic development reduces social security expenditures.
Total employment and the two oil crises, on the other hand, significantly increase social se-
curity spending in the West German states. Hamburg and Bremen do not only spend more
overall; they also have higher growth rates of social security spending than other states. Fi-
nally, German unification has led to a significant reduction of social security spending across
the German states.
4 Conclusion
German state governments cannot exploit monetary or tax instruments to finance oppor-
tunistic policies in the pre-election period. From this point of view, it has been puzzling
why they have largely abstained from extensively raising their state budget deficits albeit
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being legally able to ignore the restrictive Maastricht criteria. In fact, the public debt of the
West German states has never exceeded the legal ceiling of the Maastricht criteria of 60%
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Across the German states, Bremen ranks first with
an average fiscal deficit of approximately 34% of the GDP followed by Saarland with ap-
proximately 30%. On the lower end we find the states of Southern Germany, Bayern and
Baden-Württemberg, with about 10% and 12%, respectively.
This paper investigated the link between political budget cycles and their empirical im-
plications and shed some further light on fiscal strategies of incumbents who aim to get
re-elected. A unified analysis of both opportunistic electoral strategies and their constraints
demonstrated that governments may use alternative fiscal instruments to manipulate the
economy before elections. Most importantly, the analysis provided some evidence that the
conflicting results of empirical studies on deficit spending in the pre-election period should
not lead to too optimistic conclusions about the government’s inability to manipulate the
economy before elections. Rather, those findings are largely congruent with my argument
that different fiscal strategies are highly interrelated. Incumbents face a trade off. They want
to increase voter welfare but are constrained by voters’ fiscal conservatism. Even if cycles in
monetary policies, taxation, or deficit spending are not possible due to domestic or interna-
tional constraints, governments with sufficient budgetary policy autonomy may by all means
exploit expenditure policies to gain voter support. The empirical analysis has indicated that
although (or rather because) governments abstain from raising deficits or expenditures they
manipulate the budget cycle in the pre-election period by increasing transfer payments on
social security.
The paper focused on cycles in expenditure policies but governments in countries with
high fiscal transparency can also generate electoral cycles if they rely on revenue policies.
In line with my findings, scholars provide evidence of political partisan cycles in privatiza-
tion efforts (Belke and Schneider 2006; Belke et al. 2007). This implies that governments
increase privatization efforts to lower deficits and to increase economic growth (e.g., Belke
et al. 2007: 20). Governments could use the expansion of revenues to generate budget cycles
without further straining the budget. In other words, they could signal economic competence
by increasing privatization efforts before the elections.
My findings open new interesting venues for future research. Scholars should not only
analyze whether governments use a particular fiscal strategy in the electoral period but they
should also theoretically and empirically investigate the conditions under which govern-
ments are likely to pursue alternative fiscal strategies. The findings presented here already
pointed to different factors driving incumbent strategies. Following this argument, govern-
ments are likely to increase the voters’ welfare by raising public deficits if the domestic
institutional framework ensures that governments can successfully hide higher deficits from
the electorate. If higher deficits are observable, however, then governments have to rely on
other (potentially more costly) strategies. Voters indeed seem to award a short term improve-
ment of their welfare before elections. As governments shy away from increasing overall
expenditures in the pre-election period, the increase in social security expenditures requires
a shifting of resources across budgetary items as a valuable alternative for opportunistic
governments in Western democracies. Future research should investigate them in an inte-
grated framework to shed more light on one of the most prominent and interesting features
of domestic politics.
Acknowledgements I gratefully acknowledge valuable comments from two anonymous reviewers, the
editors of Public Choice, Dave Armstrong, Mark Pickup, Thomas Plümper, and Vera Troeger. The project
was funded by the German Research Foundation. All errors remain my responsibility.
142 Public Choice (2010) 142: 125–150
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommer-
cial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix: Web
Table 5 Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Deficit Growth 270 0.07 0.05 −0.12 0.31
Spending Growth 270 0.03 0.04 −0.12 −0.14
Social Security Spending Growth 270 0.05 0.06 −0.13 0.25
Pre-election Year 270 0.14 0.28 0 1
Inflation (Federal Level) 270 0.55 0.74 −2.30 1.44
Employment (State Level) 270 7.53 0.98 5.90 9.04
GDP Growth Rate (State Level) 270 0.02 0.02 −0.05 0.07
City States 270 0.20 0.40 0 1
Unification 270 0.44 0.50 0 1
1. Oil Crisis 270 0.04 0.19 0 1
2. Oil Crisis 270 0.15 0.36 0 1
Winning Margin (Government) 270 51.83 6.21 31.3 79.7
SPD in Government 270 0.56 0.50 0 1
FDP in Government 270 0.26 0.44 0 1
Grand Coalition 270 0.05 0.21 0 1
Maastricht 270 0.41 0.49 0 1
Table 6 Robustness check: election year
Deficit Spending Social security
Pre-election Year −0.021** 0.003 −0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Maastricht 0.010 −0.062* −0.065*
(0.024) (0.034) (0.037)
Maastricht*Preelection 0.016 −0.018 0.038**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018)
Election Year −0.001 −0.000 −0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Inflation (Federal) 0.002 0.007 0.001
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
Employment (State) 0.314** 0.096 0.570**
(0.086) (0.102) (0.125)
GDP Growth (State) −0.361* 0.096 −0.485
(0.202) (0.292) (0.318)
City States 0.449** 0.131** 0.792**
(0.027) (0.038) (0.042)
Unification −0.019 0.013 −0.042
(0.019) (0.037) (0.040)
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Table 6 (Continued)
Deficit Spending Social security
1. Oil Crisis 0.024* 0.036* 0.086**
(0.013) (0.020) (0.022)
2. Oil Crisis 0.003** 0.016** 0.037**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Trend −0.005 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Residuals 1.007** 0.931** 1.015**
(0.008) (0.013) (0.004)
Constant −2.265** −0.717** −4.380**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 280 240 240
Adjusted R-squared 0.562 0.258 0.323
F 1462** 506.3** 5814**
Two-tailed test ∗ = p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05; robust standard errors are in parentheses
Table 7 Robustness check: post-election year
Deficit Spending Social security
Pre-election Year −0.019** 0.001 0.000
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Maastricht 0.010 −0.063* −0.066*
(0.023) (0.034) (0.038)
Maastricht*Preelection 0.016 −0.017 0.038**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018)
Postelection Year 0.006 −0.004 −0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Inflation (Federal) 0.002 0.007 0.001
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
Employment (State) 0.315** 0.096 0.570**
(0.085) (0.102) (0.126)
GDP Growth (State) −0.370* 0.101 −0.482
(0.200) (0.292) (0.319)
City States 0.450** 0.130** 0.791**
(0.026) (0.038) (0.042)
Unification −0.021 0.013 −0.041
(0.018) (0.037) (0.040)
1. Oil Crisis 0.024* 0.037* 0.084**
(0.013) (0.020) (0.022)
2. Oil Crisis 0.003** 0.016** 0.036**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Trend −0.005 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
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Table 7 (Continued)
Deficit Spending Social security
Residuals 1.009** 0.924** 1.015**
(0.008) (0.013) (0.004)
Constant −2.275** −0.710** −4.373**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 280 240 240
Adjusted R-squared 0.563 0.259 0.323
F 1536 504.4 5779
Two-tailed test ∗ = p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05; robust standard errors are in parentheses
Table 8 Robustness check: coalition governments
Deficit Spending Social security
Pre-election Year −0.021** 0.002 0.000
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
Maastricht 0.008 −0.064* −0.069*
(0.024) (0.034) (0.036)
Maastricht*Preelection 0.018 −0.015 0.040**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.018)
SPD 0.001 −0.006 −0.018*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
SPD, FDP 0.012 0.001 −0.001
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
CDU, FDP 0.012 −0.001 −0.015
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
SPD, Gruene 0.002 −0.008 −0.026
(0.014) (0.016) (0.019)
Grand Coalition −0.004 −0.005 0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Inflation (Federal) 0.002 0.007 0.001
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
Employment (State) 0.268** 0.103 0.652**
(0.088) (0.113) (0.141)
GDP Growth (State) −0.384* 0.088 −0.484
(0.201) (0.290) (0.309)
City States 0.387** 0.143** 0.910**
(0.027) (0.038) (0.041)
Unification −0.016 0.015 −0.043
(0.019) (0.037) (0.039)
1. Oil Crisis 0.023* 0.034* 0.079**
(0.013) (0.020) (0.021)
2. Oil Crisis 0.002* 0.015** 0.035**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
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Table 8 (Continued)
Deficit Spending Social security
Trend −0.005 0.001 0.001
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
Residuals 1.015** 0.914** 1.005**
(0.010) (0.012) (0.004)
Constant −1.916** −0.766** −5.006**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 280 240 240
Adjusted R-squared 0.563 0.247 0.331
F 842.2** 430.8** 5615**
Two-tailed test ∗ = p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05; robust standard errors are in parentheses
Table 9 Robustness check: partisanship of the federal government
Deficit Spending Social security
Pre-election Year −0.020** −0.000 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Maastricht −0.003 −0.062* −0.081**
(0.023) (0.035) (0.038)
Maastricht*Preelection 0.017 −0.012 0.039**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018)
SPD in Government 0.004 −0.007 −0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
FDP in Government 0.005 0.004 0.002
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016)
Grand Coalition −0.008 −0.001 0.020
(0.038) (0.058) (0.063)
SPD, FDP (Federal) 0.015 0.042* 0.033
(0.016) (0.025) (0.028)
SPD (Federal) 0.014** −0.027** 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Inflation (Federal) 0.003 0.006 0.002
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
Employment (State) 0.254** 0.057 0.589**
(0.087) (0.107) (0.136)
GDP Growth (State) −0.503** 0.060 −0.643*
(0.201) (0.300) (0.328)
City States 0.365** 0.080** 0.815**
(0.026) (0.040) (0.043)
Unification −0.026 0.005 −0.051
(0.019) (0.039) (0.042)
1. Oil Crisis 0.014 0.042 0.065**
(0.018) (0.029) (0.031)
2. Oil Crisis −0.015** 0.013** 0.012**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
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Table 9 (Continued)
Deficit Spending Social security
Trend −0.004 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Residuals 1.029** 0.964** 0.996**
(0.011) (0.022) (0.004)
Constant −1.833** −0.447** −4.551**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 280 240 240
Adjusted R-squared 0.582 0.269 0.336
F 1054** 227.2** 4170**
Two-tailed test ∗ = p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05; robust standard errors are in parentheses
Table 10 Robustness check: partisanship and budget cycles
Deficit Spending Social security
Pre-election Year −0.017* −0.001 0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Preelection*SPD −0.009 0.006 −0.015
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022)
Maastricht 0.001 −0.054** −0.090**
(0.016) (0.026) (0.028)
Maastricht*Preelection 0.020 −0.019 0.044*
(0.018) (0.020) (0.024)
Inflation (Federal) 0.001 0.008 −0.002
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
Employment (State) 0.245** 0.115 0.539**
(0.089) (0.121) (0.146)
GDP Growth (State) −0.369* 0.070 −0.451
(0.204) (0.291) (0.321)
City States 0.355** 0.158** 0.751**
(0.019) (0.037) (0.040)
1. Oil Crisis 0.023* 0.035* 0.082**
(0.013) (0.020) (0.022)
2. Oil Crisis 0.002 0.016** 0.036**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
SPD in Government −0.000 −0.003 −0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
FDP in Government 0.008 0.004 0.004
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
Grand Coalition −0.006** 0.003* 0.016**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Trend −0.006 0.001 −0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
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Table 10 (Continued)
Deficit Spending Social security
Residuals 0.998** 0.965** 1.005**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.004)
Constant −1.730** −0.864** −4.127**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Conditional coefficient −0.025 0.005 −0.007
(0.016) (0.018) (0.021)
Observations 280 240 240
Adjusted R-squared 0.560 0.249 0.310
F 630.0** 602.4** 3563**
Two-tailed test ∗ = p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05; robust standard errors are in parentheses
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